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FEATURE:

ESTATE PI ANNING & TAXATION

By Howard M. Zaritsky, Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Mitchell Gans

Treasury Proposes New Regulations to
Restrict Valuation Discount Planning
Prepare fo r a dram atic change in the scope of IRC Section 2704

rom 2010 to 2013, the Treasury attempted to
convince Congress to amend Internal Revenue
Code Section 2704 to restrict the use of partner
ships and other entities to generate valuation discounts.1
Neither house of Congress showed the slightest interest
in making these changes.
In 2013, the Treasury quit requesting these statutory
changes, but it never gave up on its desire to tighten IRC
Section 2704 to restrict valuation discount planning. On
Aug. 4, 2016, the Treasury proposed regulations that,
when finalized, may dramatically expand the scope of
Section 2704 and restrict the availability of valuation
discounts for many entities.2 If adopted as final, the
proposed regs will curtail what’s become a very com
mon means of reducing a clients estate, gift and genera
tion-skipping transfer (GST) tax obligations.

F

B rie f S u m m a ry o f S ection 2 7 0 4
Section 2704 was enacted in 1990.3 Section 2704(a)
addresses issues raised by the Tax Court’s decision in
Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner;4 which involved the
estate tax valuation of a majority interest in a family lim
ited partnership (FLP). The general partners were given
the right to compel the liquidation of the partnership
at any time and thereby recoup their capital accounts.
These rights were personal, nontransferable and termi
nated at death. The Internal Revenue Service contended
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that, because these rights gave value to the interests, they
couldn’t be ignored for estate tax valuation purposes,
even though they didn’t survive the partner’s death.
The Tax Court disagreed, noting that the estate tax
is imposed on only the value of property that can be
transferred at death and that a power that lapses at death
can’t, therefore, be considered in valuing a business
interest. Thus, the decedent’s partnership interest was
dramatically diminished in value for estate tax purposes,
although it had significant value up until death. The leg
islative history of Section 2704 states that Harrison and
“similar” cases typically involved a taxpayer successfully
sustaining a relatively low value for an interest in a busi
ness by valuing it as a going concern, notwithstanding
an effort by the IRS to value it as if liquidated.5
Section 2704(a)(1) states that, “if there is a lapse of
any voting or liquidation right in a corporation or part
nership, and the individual holding such right immedi
ately before the lapse and members of such individual’s
family hold, both before and after the lapse, control of
the entity,” such lapse will be treated as a taxable transfer.
The amount of the transfer is the difference between
the fair market value (FMV) of all interests held by the
individual immediately before the lapse (determined
as if the voting and liquidation rights were nonlapsing)
and the FMV of such interests after the lapse. A transfer
under Section 2704(a) takes the form of a taxable gift
(if the lapse occurs during the holder’s lifetime) or as an
addition to the holder’s gross estate (if the lapse occurs
at the holder’s death).
Section 2704(b), on the other hand, disregards an
“applicable restriction” when valuing an interest in a
corporation or partnership that’s transferred to or for
the benefit of a family member, if the transferor and
his family control the entity immediately before trans
fer. There are important exceptions. First, if there’s no
provision calling for the restriction to lapse and neither
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the transferor nor the transferors family can remove the
restriction, it isn’t an applicable restriction. Second, if the
restriction is “imposed, or required to be imposed, by
any Federal or State law,” it’s not an applicable restriction.6

Extension to New Types of Entities
The Treasury contended that the regs under Sec
tion 2704 needed to be updated to reflect various new
types of entities that were created after 1990 to accom
plish certain purposes. In particular, limited liability
companies (LLCs) have become very popular, but the
existing regs (and the IRC) still refer only to corpora
tions and partnerships.
The proposed regs provide that Section 2704 applies

The proposed regs narrow the
exception to the definition of a lapse
of a liquidation right to transfers
occurring three years or more
before the transferor’s death that
don’t restrict or eliminate the rights
associated with the ownership of the
transferred interest.
to corporations, partnerships, LLCs and other domestic
or foreign entities or arrangements that are business
entities under Treasury Regulations Section 301.77012(a), regardless of how the entity or arrangement is
classified for other federal tax purposes and whether
the entity or arrangement is disregarded as an entity
separate from its owner for other federal tax purposes.7
The proposed regs state that a “corporation,” for pur
poses of Section 2704, includes: (1) any business entity
organized under a federal or state statute, or under a
statute of a federally recognized Indian tribe, if the
statute describes or refers to the entity as incorporated
or as a corporation, body corporate or body politic;
(2) any business entity organized under a state statute
16
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that describes or refers to the entity as a joint-stock com
pany or joint-stock association; (3) an insurance com
pany; (4) a state-chartered business entity conducting
banking activities if any of its deposits are insured under
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or a similar federal
statute; (5) a business entity wholly owned by a state or
any political subdivision thereof; (6) a business entity
wholly owned by a foreign government or any other
entity described in Treas. Regs. Section 1.892-2T; (7) a
business entity that’s taxable as a corporation under a
provision of the IRC other than IRC Section 7701(a)(3);
and (8) certain foreign entities. A “corporation” also
will include an S corporation and a qualified subchapter
S subsidiary, which subsidiary is treated as a corpora
tion that’s separate from its parent for this purpose. The
proposed regs expressly exclude from the definition of
a “corporation” an unincorporated association that’s
taxable as a corporation.8 Generally, the proposed regs
state that a partnership is any business entity that’s not
a corporation, regardless of how it’s classified for federal
tax purposes. Therefore, a partnership includes an LLC
that’s not an S corporation, whether or not it’s a disre
garded entity for tax purposes.9
The proposed regs break from the statutory reference
to just corporations and partnerships in two situations:
for purposes of the tests to determine control of an
entity and whether a restriction is imposed under state
law. The form of a business entity or arrangement that
isn’t a corporation will, for these purposes, be deter
mined under local law, regardless of how it’s classified
for other federal tax purposes and whether it’s disre
garded as an entity for federal tax purposes. In these
cases, local law means the law of the domestic or foreign
jurisdiction under which the entity or arrangement is
created or organized. Consequently, in applying these
two tests, there are three types of entities: corporations,
partnerships (general and limited partnerships (LPs))
and other business entities (including LLCs that aren’t
S corporations).10
The Section 2704 rules apply only to entities that
the transferor’s family controls. Section 2704(c)(1)
defines “control” using the definition found in IRC Sec
tion 2701(b)(2). The proposed regs clarify that control
of an LLC or any other entity or arrangement that isn’t
a corporation, partnership or LP means holding at least
50 percent of either the capital or profits interests of the
entity or arrangement or holding any equity interest,
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with the ability to cause the full or partial liquidation
of the entity or arrangement.11 Thus, the determination
of the type of entity establishes the precise tests for
figuring out what interests are required to constitute
control over the entity.
The explanation of how LLCs and other entities that
aren’t partnerships or corporations should be treated
“repairs” a serious gap in the guidance that left practi
tioners trying to make sense of whether and, if so, how
the partnership rules might apply to an LLC. Taxpayers
and their advisors should welcome this part of the pro
posed regs as important clarifications of the rules. The
rest of the proposed regs, perhaps, won’t be as welcome.

V o t i n g and L i q u i d a t i o n Rights
Section 2704(a) applies to voting and liquidation rights.
The current regs define a “liquidation right” as the
power (including one associated with aggregate voting
power) to compel the entity to acquire all or part of the
holder’s equity interest, whether or not this would result
in the complete liquidation of the entity.12 The current
regs also state that a lapse of a liquidation right is the
restriction or elimination of a presently exercisable liqui
dation right.13 Section 2704(a) doesn’t, however, apply to
a transfer that doesn’t restrict or eliminate a liquidation
or voting right with respect to the transferred interest.
For example, a gift of a minority interest by the holder
of a controlling interest sufficient to compel liquidation
isn’t itself a lapse under Section 2704(a), even though
the transferor no longer has sufficient voting control to
compel liquidation.14
The proposed regs make several changes in the scope
of Section 2704(a) to expand its application. First, the
proposed regs confirm that the transfer of a partnership
interest in a family controlled partnership to an assignee,
who neither has nor may exercise the voting or liquida
tion rights of a partner, is a lapse of the voting and liq
uidation rights associated with the transferred interest.15
The Preamble to the proposed regs explains that this
change merely confirms that a transfer that results in the
restriction or elimination of a voting or liquidation right
associated with the transferred interest is a lapse under
Section 2704(a).16 It’s not, however, clear whether this
rule will apply when the transferee becomes a partner
only on the vote of the remaining partners within a
reasonable time after the transfer is made, so it may be
preferable, if this proposal is adopted, to have the other
NOVEMBER 2016
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partners approve the transferee as a new partner before
the interest is transferred, to avoid an unintended lapse.
Second, the proposed regs narrow the exception to
the definition of a lapse of a liquidation right to transfers
occurring three years or more before the transferor’s
death that don’t restrict or eliminate the rights associ
ated with the ownership of the transferred interest.17
Therefore, a gift of a minority interest by a donor who
had sufficient power, before the gift, to compel liquida
tion, would, if made within three years of the donors
death, be a taxable transfer under Section 2704(a), even
though the minority interest never had a liquidation
right. This gift would result in an additional inclusion in
the gross estate equal to the difference between the value
of the donor’s total interest before the gift and the value
of the donors total interest after the gift, thereby elimi
nating the minority interest discount usually associated
with such a gift.
In the Preamble, the Treasury explains that this
change was appropriate to avoid deathbed tax planning.
It cites Estate of Murphy v. Comm’r,n which did in fact
reject deathbed “attempts to avoid taxation of the con
trol value of stock holdings through bifurcation of the
blocks.”19The Preamble doesn’t, however, cite a contrary
holding under almost identical facts in Estate of Frank
v. Comm’r.20 Nonetheless, the Treasury states that such
deathbed transfers “generally have minimal economic
effects, but result in a transfer tax value that is less than
the value of the interest either in the hands of the dece
dent prior to death or in the hands of the decedent’s
family immediately after death.”21 That statement may
be difficult to refute. The Treasury also states that the
3-year “bright-line test” is desirable because it avoids
“the fact-intensive inquiry underlying a determination
of a donor’s subjective motive which is administratively
burdensome for both taxpayers and the IRS.”22
The proposed regs modify Treas. Regs. Sec
tion 25.2704-l(f), Example 4, to illustrate the breadth
and impact of this change. In the example, D, an indi
vidual, owns 84 percent of the stock in Corporation,
whose bylaws require at least 70 percent of the vote to
liquidate. D gives one-half of D’s stock in equal shares
to D’s three children. D is deemed to have given up D’s
right to liquidate or control Corporation by making
this gift, and if the gift transfers occurred within three
years of D’s death, they’ll be treated as if the lapse of
the liquidation right occurred at D’s death. This result
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is the rough equivalent of including in D’s gross estate
an additional nondeductible asset equal to the minority
and marketability discounts of the three gifts or, per
haps, increasing the value of what’s included in the gross
estate. This distinction may be important for purposes
of determining the assets basis pursuant to IRC Sec
tion 1014, as we discuss later.
Third, the proposed regs conform Sec
tion 2704(a) to certain changes made primarily with
respect to 2704(b). Specifically, the proposed regs would:
(1) reiterate the existing provision for testing a family’s
ability to liquidate an interest by taking into account
state law, as modified by any provision in the organizing
documents, but without regard to any restriction within
the scope of Section 2704(b); (2) clarify that the man-

The change in the exception from
applicable restriction classification for
restrictions that are mandatory under
state or federal law, as opposed to
those that are default rules, appears
to eliminate most marketability and all
minority discounts for family-owned
entities.
ner in which liquidation may be achieved is irrelevant;
and (3) conform the applicable restriction regs to the
proposed provision for disregarding certain non-family
member interests in testing the family’s ability to remove
a restriction that may be a disregarded restriction.23
Fourth, the proposed regs would adopt new attribu
tion rules with respect to the determination of family
control for purposes of Section 2704(a), which would
deem an individual, his estate and members of his family
to own, for this purpose, any interest held indirectly by
him through a corporation, partnership, trust or other
entity, under the rules contained in Treas. Regs. Sec
tion 25.2701-6. This appears to eliminate the previous
limitation on attribution that permitted attribution only
18

trusts

&

estates

of interests that would be included in the individual’s
gross estate if he died immediately before the lapse. This
change could result in a much greater attribution of
ownership and control for purposes of Section 2704(a),
because it would attribute to an individual interests
owned by a trust of which that individual is merely a
beneficiary and over which the individual holds no gen
eral power of appointment.

Restrictions
The most dramatic changes under the proposed regs
relate to the operation of Section 2704(b). In the
Preamble, the Treasury explains that the effectiveness
of Section 2704(b) has been limited because: (1) practi
tioners have made a point of transferring a partnership
interest to an assignee, rather than to a partner, which
together with state legislation that restricts the rights of
assignees, decreases the gift and estate tax value of a part
nership24 interest transferred; (2) courts have held that
Section 2704(b) applies only to restrictions on the ability
to liquidate an entire entity and not to restrictions on the
ability to liquidate a transferred interest in that entity;25
(3) state LP (or similar) statutes have been revised to
allow liquidation of the entity only on the unanimous
vote of all owners (unless provided otherwise in the
partnership agreement) and to eliminate the statutory
default provision that had allowed a limited partner to
liquidate his limited partner interest, so that a limited
partner won’t ordinarily be able to withdraw from the
partnership or have imposed other elective restrictions
on liquidation; and (4) taxpayers have avoided the
application of Section 2704(b) by transferring a nomi
nal partnership interest to a non-family member, such
as a charity or an employee, to ensure that the family
alone doesn’t have the power to remove a restriction.26
The Treasury, therefore, proposes to impose stricter
rules on determining what’s an applicable restriction
under Section 2704(b) and to create an entirely new
class of disregarded restrictions that aren’t applicable
restrictions, but that will be disregarded in valuing
transferred entity interests under Section 2704(b).
Applicable restrictions. The proposed regs make
several significant changes in the treatment of applica
ble restrictions. First, the proposed regs confirm that
an applicable restriction only includes a restriction on
the holder’s ability to liquidate the entity (in whole or
in part), but not a restriction on the holder’s ability to
liquidate his own interest.27 (Restrictions on the holder’s
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ability to liquidate his own interest is the subject of Prop.
Treas. Regs. Section 25.2704-3.)
Second, the proposed regs clarify that the exception
for restrictions “imposed, or required to be imposed,
by any Federal or State law” includes only restrictions
imposed by the United States, any state or the District of
Columbia.28This appears to exclude restrictions that are
imposed by a locality, quasi-governmental body, foreign
country or subdivision of a foreign country.
Third, the proposed regs state that a restriction is
imposed or required to be imposed by federal or state
law only if it can’t be removed or overridden and is m an
dated by the applicable law, is required to be included in
the governing documents or otherwise is made manda
tory.29This represents a dramatic change to the present
rules, which treat default provisions of state laws that
can be waived or varied by the governing instrument
as exempt from the definition of applicable restrictions.
Under the new rules, restrictions such as those on liq
uidation or transfer of a partnership interest under laws
like the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act will
now be classified as applicable restrictions and ignored
for purposes of valuing interests in the entity for estate,
gift and GST tax purposes.
The change in the exception from applicable restric
tion classification for restrictions that are mandatory
under state or federal law, as opposed to those that are
default rules, appears to eliminate most marketability
and all minority discounts for family-owned entities. No
state or federal law prohibits an entity from giving every
one of its equity owners a right to compel liquidation
of the entity at any time. Therefore, such a right would
be imputed to every family-owned entity, for gift, estate
and GST transfer tax purposes under Prop. Treas. Regs.
Sections 25.2704-2(a) and 25.2704-2(b)(4)(ii).
Fourth, the proposed regs state that a restriction
imposed by a state law that can’t be removed or over
ridden is still an applicable restriction in two situations:
(1) if the state law is limited in its application to certain
narrow classes of entities, particularly family-controlled
entities; and (2) if the law under which the entity was cre
ated also provides (either at the time the entity was orga
nized or thereafter) an optional provision that doesn’t
include the restriction or that allows it to be removed
or overridden or that provides a different statute for the
creation and governance of that same type of entity that
doesn’t mandate the restriction, makes the restriction
optional or permits the restriction to be superseded.30
NOVEMBER 2016
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This would preclude the avoidance of Section 2704(b)
by having a state legislature create a new class of entity
that includes mandatory limitations on liquidation and
transfer, if there’s another form of entity available that
has no similar restrictions. Adopting the requirement
that only mandatory restrictions are excluded from
the operation of Section 2704(b) renders the state and
federal statutory exception very nearly meaningless.
Governments recognize that some flexibility is required
in genuine business arrangements, and so none would
strictly prohibit allowing a member, for example, to
compel liquidation, as that may be necessary to entice
certain investors in some business arrangements.
Prop. Treas. Regs. Section 25.2704-2(b)(4)(ii) states
that this rule will apply to “particularly those types
of entities (such as family-controlled entities) most
likely to be subject to transfers described in section 2704
. . .” It’s unclear whether “family-controlled entities,” in
this sentence, adopts the same definition of control oth
erwise applicable to Section 2704(b) or will be subject
to a higher or lower standard of control. It seems likely
that this determination will need to be made on a caseby-case basis.
The regs refer to the existence of a second statute
for creating “that same type of entity.” It’s not clear what
constitutes “that same type of entity” for this purpose.
For example, an entity that, by law, must be subject to
a mandatory restriction on liquidation or voting might
arguably not be the “same type of entity” as one that, by
law, has a choice whether to include such restrictions,
if the two entities otherwise have significantly different
features, such as duration and the number and identity
of permissible members. We hope that the final regs will
clarify this issue.
Fifth, the proposed regs state that an applicable
restriction doesn’t include a restriction if each holder
of an interest in the entity has a put right that’s enforce
able under applicable local law, entitling each holder to
receive from the entity or from one or more other hold
ers, on liquidation or redemption of the holder’s interest,
within six months after the date the holder gives notice
of the holder’s intent to withdraw, cash and/or other
property with a value that’s at least equal to the “m in
imum value” of the interest determined as of the date
of the liquidation or redemption.31 It seems likely that,
if this provision remains part of the final regs, at least
some, if not most, FLPs and LLCs will include such a put
right, to avoid the application of Section 2704.
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Sixth, the proposed regs state that, for purposes of
Section 2704(b) only, if part of a decedents interest in
an entity includible in his gross estate passes by reason
of death to members of both the decedents family and
persons who aren’t members of the decedents family,
the part passing to the members of the decedent’s family
is to be valued by disregarding an applicable restriction,
and that part is treated as a single, separate property
interest. In such cases, the part passing to one or more
persons who aren’t members of the decedent’s family
is also treated as a single, separate property interest.32
Consequently, the valuation discounts usually associated
with the interest passing to the non-family members
would seem to be preserved.
Disregarded restrictions. The most dramatic change

The p r o p o s e d regs e l i m i n a t e
a n y m i n o r i t y d i s c o u n t and
eliminate or dram a tically
s u p p r e s s DLOMs.
in Section 2704(b) is the creation of a new category of
“disregarded restrictions.” The purpose of this change
is to ignore in valuing an interest in a family-controlled
entity many of the restrictions that have been used
in the past to reduce the value of such interests, but
which, for various reasons, aren’t themselves “applicable
restrictions.”33 The FMV of an interest in an entity is
determined by assuming that all disregarded restrictions
didn’t exist; the FMV of such entity is determined under
generally accepted valuation principles, including any
appropriate discounts or premiums.
Prop. Treas. Regs. Section 25.2704-3 states that any
restriction in a family-controlled entity that limits an
owner’s right to liquidate his interest in the entity will
be disregarded if it will lapse at any time after the trans
fer or if the transferor or his family members, without
regard to certain interests held by non-family members,
can remove or override the restriction. A disregarded
restriction includes one that: (1) limits the ability of the
holder of the interest to liquidate the transferred interest;
(2) limits the liquidation proceeds to an amount that’s
less than a minimum value (discussed below); (3) defers
20
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the payment of the liquidation proceeds for more than
six months; or (4) permits the payment of the liquida
tion proceeds in any manner other than in cash or other
property, other than certain notes.34 The proposed regs
state that a disregarded restriction includes any limit
on the time and manner of payment of the liquidation
proceeds. Thus, a provision permitting deferral of full
payment beyond six months or permitting payment in
any manner other than in cash or property would be
a disregarded restriction. For this purpose, “property”
doesn’t include a note or other obligation issued directly
or indirectly by the entity, other holders of an interest
in the entity or persons related to either. Property does,
however, include the note of an entity engaged in an
active trade or business to the extent that: (1) the liq
uidation proceeds aren’t attributable to passive assets;35
and (2) the note is adequately secured, requires periodic
payments on a non-deferred basis, is issued at market
interest rates and has an FMV (when discounted to
present value) equal to the liquidation proceeds.36
Exceptions that apply to applicable restrictions
under the current and proposed regs also apply to
disregarded restrictions, including: (1) commercial
ly reasonable restrictions on liquidation imposed by
an unrelated person providing capital to the entity;
(2) requirements imposed by federal or state law; and
(3) an option, right to use property or agreement that’s
subject to IRC Section 2703.37
Disregarded restrictions also wouldn’t include:
(1) an enforceable put right held by each holder of an
interest in the entity, entitling the holder to receive, on
liquidation or redemption of the holders interest, cash
or other property with a value that’s at least equal to the
minimum value discussed above; (2) the full amount
of such cash and other property that must be paid
within six months after the holder gives notice to the
entity of the holders intent to liquidate any part or all
of the holder’s interest or withdraw from the entity; and
(3) the other property that must be paid within six
months that doesn’t include a note or other obligation
issued directly or indirectly by the entity, by one or more
holders of interests in the entity or by a person related
either to the entity or to any holder of an interest in the
entity.38 The proposed regs don’t provide any specific
definition of “related” when that word is used in the
discussion of put rights.
If an entity is engaged in an active trade or busi
ness at least 60 percent of whose value consists of the
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non-passive assets of that trade or business, and to the
extent that the liquidation proceeds aren’t attributable
to passive assets, the proceeds of such a put may include
a note or other obligation if such note is adequately
secured, requires periodic payments on a non-deferred
basis, is issued at market interest rates and has an FMV
on the date of the liquidation or redemption equal to the
liquidation proceeds.39
The proposed regs state that, for purposes of this put
right, “local law” is the law of the domestic or foreign
jurisdiction that governs liquidation or redemption
rights with regard to interests in the entity and that
“other property” doesn’t include a note or other obli
gation issued directly or indirectly by the entity, one or
more holders of interests in the entity or one or more
persons related either to the entity or to any holder of
an interest in the entity.40 “Other property” also doesn’t
include a note or other obligation if: (1) the entity is
engaged in an active trade or business, at least 60 percent
of whose value consists of the non-passive assets of that
trade or business and to the extent that the liquidation
proceeds aren’t attributable to passive assets (as defined
in IRC Section 6166(b)(9)(B), relating to the option
to pay estate tax attributable to certain closely held
businesses for an extended period after death); and (2)
the note or obligation is adequately secured, requires
periodic payments on a non-deferred basis, is issued
at market interest rates and has an FMV on the date
of liquidation or redemption equal to the liquidation
proceeds.41
Prop. Treas. Regs. Section 25.2704-3(g), Example 1
illustrates the application of the new “put right” concept.
In the example, Parent gives a 33 percent LP interest to
Child A and an equal interest to Child B. Under appli
cable local law, a limited partner may withdraw from an
LP at the time or on the occurrence of events specified
in the partnership agreement. Under the partnership
agreement: (1) liquidation will occur in 2066 unless
all of the partners unanimously agree to an earlier liq
uidation; (2) no limited partner may withdraw from
the partnership; and (3) the approval of all partners is
required to amend the agreement. None of these provi
sions is mandated by local law.
The example states that the prohibition on with
drawal is a disregarded restriction because it imposes a
restriction on the ability of the partner to compel a liqui
dation (redemption) of his interest, and it’s not mandat
ed by state or federal law. Family members could remove
N O V E M B E R 2016
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the restriction after the transfer, so the interest given to
each child must be valued without taking into account
the partnership agreement provision that prevents a
limited partner from compelling a redemption of his
interest. In Kerr v. Comm’r,42 the Tax Court concluded
that a restriction on the right to force a redemption of
a partnership interest, as opposed to the right to force a
liquidation of the entire partnership, wasn’t an applicable
restriction. The restriction in Kerr would now be treated
as a disregarded restriction under the proposed regs, as
reflected in this example.
This deemed put right should have the effect of
denying any minority discount and largely reducing
or eliminating any discount for lack of marketability
(DLOM). The IRS states that the DLOM reflects the
fact that “a minority interest in an unlisted corporations
stock is more difficult to sell than a similar block of list
ed stock.”43 Also, it’s been noted that, “[i]n addition to
being harder to sell, shares of closely held firms are far
less suitable than their publicly traded counterparts for
use as collateral for a loan.”44 Because the proposed regs
would essentially grant each transferee a deemed right to
demand a proportionate value of the “minimum value,”
which is the value of the underlying net assets, there
may be little or no DLOM for the interest transferred.
Nonetheless, the underlying assets of the entity might be
valued with a DLOM (for example, when the entity owns
an interest in a closely held business). If the holder of an
interest in the entity is deemed to have a right to compel
the redemption of his interest, the value of that interest
is less significantly affected by lack of marketability or
lack of control. In appropriate circumstances, however,
one could argue that the value of assets inside the entity
should be reduced to reflect a DLOM for those assets.45
The result will be the same whether or not the part
nership agreement expressly gives the partners a put
right. Assuming that no mandatory provision in state
or federal law precludes the partnership from granting
a put right, and it’s difficult to imagine such a provision
under state or federal law, the proposed regs would dis
regard the failure to grant a put right and deem every
owner of an interest in the entity to have a right to com
pel the liquidation of his interest. That is, the proposed
regs read in to every entity’s governing documents a put
right, unless there’s both a mandatory state or federal law
precluding it and no alternative law under which such
a right could be granted. Consequently, the proposed
regs eliminate any minority discount and eliminate or
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dramatically suppress DLOMs.
Example: Assume Parent, who owns all of the out
standing shares of Corporation, makes a lifetime gift
to Daughter of one share. The gift is made more than
three years before Parents death (thereby avoiding the
new deathbed lapse rule under Prop. Treas. Regs. Sec
tion 25.2704-l(c)(l)). Under state law, as is typically
the case, the holder of such a minority interest wouldn’t
have the right to compel a liquidation. Under tradition
al valuation rules, the stock given to Daughter would be
valued as a minority interest that cant compel a redemp
tion. That wouldn’t be the result under the proposed
regs. The failure to confer in the governing documents a
right on each shareholder to compel a liquidation of the
entity would be disregarded under Prop. Treas. Regs. Sec-

T h e a p p lic a tio n o f th e tr a n s fe r
w it h in t h r e e y e a r s o f d e a t h r u le
a n d th e d is r e g a r d e d r e s t r ic t io n
r u le s m a y r e s u l t in a n u n i n t e n d e d
d o u b le c o u n tin g .

tion 25.2704-2. Put simply, even in this classic case of a
gift of a minority interest, a minority discount wouldn’t
be allowed absent a mandatory provision under state
law prohibiting the grant of such a liquidation right.
One might, however, argue that the right of the
minority owners to compel redemption of their own
interests, which the agreements will prohibit but which
prohibition must be ignored under the proposed regs,
creates an additional contingent liability for the entity
to fund such a redemption, thereby reducing the value
of the going concern. Such a required reserve would tie
up the company’s operating capital and could cripple
its future earnings. This contingent liability should be
considered under Section 2704(b), whether or not the
put right is actually contained in the document. Sec
tion 2704(b) states that the value of the interest is deter
mined without regard to any applicable restrictions. The
proposed regs ignore any restriction on the right to liq
uidate the entity or one’s own interest, beyond a 6-month
put right exercisable at the minimum value.
trusts

Nothing in the proposed regs suggests a different
result would apply for an active business than for a hold
ing company. The deemed right to compel liquidation
treats the holder of the interest as if he were entitled to
receive a proportionate share of “the fair market value
. . . of the property held by the entity, reduced by the
outstanding obligations of the entity)’46 With an active
business, the assets would include not only the real
property and tangible personal property, but also the
intangible assets, such as goodwill, customer lists, pat
ents, trademarks and going concern value. The net value
of the individual’s interest would be the same whether
the business is a holding company or a going concern.
In determining whether the transferor and/or the
transferor’s family can remove a disregarded restriction,
any interest in the entity held by an individual who isn’t a
member of the transferor’s family is disregarded if, at the
time of the transfer: (1) the interest has been held by such
individual for less than three years; (2) the interest consti
tutes less than 10 percent of the value of all of the equity
interests in a corporation or constitutes less than 10 percent
of the capital and profits interests in a partnership, LLC
or similar business entity described in Treas. Regs. Sec
tion 301.7701-2(a); (3) when combined with the inter
ests of all other individuals who aren’t members of
the transferor’s family, the interest constitutes less than
20 percent of the value of all of the equity interests in
a corporation or constitutes less than 20 percent of the
capital and profits interests in a business entity other
than a corporation (for example, less than a 20 percent
interest in the capital and profits of a partnership); or
(4) any such individual, as the owner of an interest, has
no enforceable right to receive in exchange for such
interest, on no more than six months’ prior notice, the
minimum value referred to in the definition of a disre
garded restriction.47
The last of these requirements, that the non-family
member have a put right, is noteworthy on several levels.
First, it’s a severe and unnecessary requirement to impose
if the goal is merely to avoid using nominal interests to
avoid the requirements of Section 2704(b) with respect
to disregarded restrictions. A 10 percent interest (with
aggregate non-family interests of 20 percent) would
appear to be sufficient to accomplish this task.
Second, this requirement will force practitioners
to modify the governing instruments for entities that
aren’t owned entirely by a family. These instruments will
need to include an actual put right and can’t rely on the
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imputation of a put right to assure that the non-family
members’ interests are taken into account in determin
ing whether the transferor and/or the transferors family
can remove a disregarded restriction.
The determination of whether the family can remove
the restriction in a disregarded interest is made by
assuming that the remaining interests are the sole
interests in the entity.48 Parenthetically, in Kerr, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit indicated that Sec
tion 2704(b)(2) doesn’t contemplate the possibility that
the IRS could disregard a non-family member. Perhaps,
that accounts for the IRS’decision to include the non-family member concept only in Prop. Treas. Regs. Sec
tion 25.2704-3 and not in Prop. Treas. Regs. Sec
tion 25.2704-2. One could easily imagine the validity of
the non-family member concept becoming the subject
of litigation, given the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion.
U n in te n d e d

D o u b le C o u n tin g

The application of the transfer within three years of
death rule and the disregarded restriction rules may
result in an unintended double counting.
Example: Assume T owns 51 percent of the stock
in Corporation, and T ’s children own the remaining
49 percent. Corporation has a liquidation value of $100,
and the 51 percent holding gives T the right to liquidate
Corporation and receive 51 percent of Corporation’s liq
uidation, $51. T gives his children 2 percent of the stock,
and T thereby loses the right to liquidate Corporation.
The loss of the liquidation right reduces the value of the
51 percent T held prior to the gift interest to $40 or an
$11 reduction in value, which will be treated as trans
ferred at T’s death and be added to the value of T’s gross
estate under the transfer within three years of death
rule. W hen T dies, T’s remaining 49 percent—all other
things being equal—will be valued with an assumed put
right, meaning it will be worth $49. O f that, $11 will
be included in T ’s gross estate because of the transfer
within three years of death rule, plus $49 for the 49 per
cent of the stock, for a total of $60. If T had retained the
51 percent of the stock until death, its value, all other
things being equal, would be only $51.
Certainly, the Treasury’s proposals will have to be
amended to prevent such a double counting of value
effect. Perhaps, if these changes will be extensive, the
Treasury should issue new proposed regs so the public
may comment on them, rather than embed them into
the final regs.
NOVEMBER 2016
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Section 2704(b) applies to intra-family transfers in
family-controlled entities for all estate, gift and GST
tax purposes. Where, and to the extent that, an interest
in an entity qualifies for the gift or estate tax marital
deduction and must be valued by taking into account
the applicable restriction and disregarded restriction
rules of Section 2704(b), the same value generally will
apply in computing the marital deduction attributable to
that interest. The value of the estate tax marital deduc
tion may be further affected, however, by other factors
justifying a different value, such as the application of a
control premium.49
Section 2704(b) doesn’t apply to transfers to non-fam
ily members and so doesn’t affect the value of an inter
est passing to charity or to an individual other than a
family member. If part of an entity interest includible
in the gross estate passes to family members and part
of that interest passes to non-family members, and if
(taking into account the proposed rules regarding the
treatment of certain interests held by non-family mem
bers) the part passing to the decedent’s family members
is valued under Section 2704(b), the proposed regs
provide that the part passing to the family members
is treated as a property interest separate from the part
passing to non-family members. The FMV of the part
passing to the family members is determined taking
into account the special valuation assumptions of Sec
tion 2704(b), as well as any other relevant factors, such
as those supporting a control premium. The FMV value
of the part passing to the non-family members is deter
mined without the special valuation assumptions of
Section 2704(b). Hence, if the sole non-family member
receiving an interest is a charity, the interest generally
will have the same value for both estate tax inclusion and
deduction purposes. If the interest passing to non-fam
ily members, however, is divided between charities and
other non-family members, considerations other than
Section 2704 may apply, resulting in a different value for
charitable deduction purposes.50
E ffe c tiv e

D a te s

The changes relating to the extension of Section 2701
(estate freezing recapitalizations) to entities other than
corporations and partnerships would be effective on
and after the date of publication of the final regs in the
Federal Register.
The changes relating to the lapse of a voting or
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liquidation right under Section 2704(a) will apply to the
lapse of rights created after Oct. 8, 1990, to the extent
that the lapse occurs on or after the date of publication
of the final regs in the Federal Register.
The changes relating to applicable restrictions under
Section 2704(b) would apply to transfers of property
subject to restrictions created after Oct. 8, 1990, to the
extent that the transfer occurs on or after the date of
publication of the final regs in the Federal Register.
The new rules on disregarded restrictions will apply
to transfers of property subject to restrictions created
after Oct. 8, 1990, to the extent that the transfer occurs
30 or more days after the date of publication of the final
regs in the Federal Register.
The proposed regs don’t provide any rules for restric
tions created before Oct. 9, 1990, which are amended
after Oct. 8, 1990. One should anticipate that any sub
stantial change in an effective date-protected restriction
will be deemed to create a new restriction that falls
under the proposed regs. It’s less clear, however, whether
a post-Oct. 8, 1990 change in a pre-Oct. 9, 1990 instru
ment that doesn’t itself change the restriction will cause
the proposed regs to apply. Generally, practitioners
should be wary about any changes to a pre-Oct. 9, 1990
instrument that contains a restriction to which the pro
posed regs might otherwise apply.

V a lid ity o f th e Proposed Regs
The Treasury took pains to explain how the IRC
authorizes the proposed regs, possibly anticipat
ing arguments that the proposed regs exceed the
scope of the IRC itself. The Treasury noted that Sec
tion 2704(a)(3) authorizes it “by regulations [to] apply
this subsection to rights similar to voting and liquida
tion rights.”31 Also, Section 2704(b)(4) authorizes the
Treasury:
. . . by regulations [to] provide that other restric
tions shall be disregarded in determining the
value of the transfer of any interest in a corpora
tion or partnership to a member of the transferor’s
family if such restriction has the effect of reducing
the value of the transferred interest for purposes
of this subtitle but does not ultimately reduce the
value of such interest to the transferee.
Traditionally, the courts distinguished between a
general authority and a specific authority regulation.52
24

This distinction, however, has been largely, if not entire
ly, erased by Mayo Foundation for Medical Education
& Research v. United States and McDonald v. Comm’r.53
Under Mayo, a regulation is valid unless: (1) Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue, and
the regs are inconsistent with Congress’ unambiguously
expressed intent; or (2) the regulation “is arbitrary or
capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.”54
Given the determinative role of Congressional intent
under Mayo, the proposed regs raise the question
whether Congress, in enacting Section 2704 and in
conferring authority on the Treasury to issue regs that
would deny effect to certain value suppressing restric
tions, permitted the denial of practically all discounts for
family-controlled entities.
Before the enactment of Section 2704, the IRS had
argued vigorously in the courts against discounts when
family was involved, essentially asking the courts to
adopt a family-attribution principle.55 The IRS lost,
ultimately conceding the issue in Revenue Ruling 93-12.
Most significantly, the Conference Report issued in con
nection with the 1990 enactment of Section 2704 states:
“[t]hese rules do not affect minority discounts or other
discounts available under present law.”56 Example 8 in
the Conference Report also illustrates that a restriction
on liquidation of a partnership is an applicable restric
tion that must be disregarded under Section 2704(b),
but then adds that “any appropriate fragmentation dis
count” would nonetheless be permitted. Congress was
presumably aware of the family-attribution litigation
when the Conference Report was drafted, which is, per
haps, why the IRS conceded the issue a few years later.
This legislative history appears to contemplate con
tinuing availability of some discounts in the family set
ting and not their complete elimination, as the proposed
regs appear to attempt. As we suggest, the question is
whether Congress definitively indicated its intent that
such discounts would remain in place. In Chevron,57
which was extended to tax regulations by Mayo,58 the
U.S. Supreme Court stated that traditional tools of stat
utory construction must be employed in determining if
Congress has spoken to the issue. “If a court, employing
traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains
that Congress had an intention on the precise question
at issue, that intention is the law and must be given
effect.”59
In General Dynamics Corp. v. Cline,60 the Supreme
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Court applied the Chevron footnote, making explic
it reference to legislative history, and concluded that
Congress’ intent was sufficiently unambiguous to dis
place an agency interpretation.61
The role of legislative history in Chevron and Mayo
isn’t entirely clear.52 Given Congress’ apparent under
standing that discounts wouldn’t be affected by the
enactment of Section 2704, it seems hard to sustain the
proposed regs, to the extent that they eliminate these
discounts by imputing into every interest in a fami
ly-controlled entity both a right to compel liquidation
of the entity and a right to compel liquidation of the
holder’s own interest.
The IRS may argue that the statute itself contemplates
a modification of discount principles in calling for the
disregard of certain restrictions and that the proposed
regs won’t affect entities that aren’t family controlled.
Still, the regs appear to ignore for estate and gift tax pur
poses the impact of restrictions on voting and liquida
tion, other than those that are mandatory under applica
ble state or federal law. Further, the proposed regs ignore
the failure to include a right to compel liquidation of the
entity or the holders personal interest. Unless the final
regs rein in these provisions significantly, their validity
will presumably be the subject of litigation. Ultimately,
the courts will need to decide whether Congress’ state
ment of its intent is sufficiently clear to prevent the IRS
from implementing its new approach.
Finally, for those who wonder about the ability of the
Treasury to issue regs that take a new approach that’s
inconsistent with prior guidance or to overrule the out
come in a prior case, like Kerr, Chevron seems to provide
a complete answer. Under Chevron, agency inconsis
tency isn’t a basis for invalidating a new approach.63
Chevron also permits, as a general matter, agencies to
overrule court decisions.64

P lanning
There are several key issues to planning under the
proposed regs. First, the effective date of the proposed
regs invites taxpayers to create and make lifetime gifts
or sales of interests in corporations, partnerships and
LLCs, as they would have done before these regs, at least
until the final regs are published in the Federal Register.
There’s no clear date when this will occur, but public
hearings on these proposed regs aren’t scheduled until
Dec. 1, 2016, so even assuming that the IRS hears noth
ing at the hearings that convinces it to change any part
NOVEMBER 2016

of the regs, the final regs couldn’t be published before
the end of this year. As there are likely to be extensive
comments provided, at least some of which will warrant
direct response from the Treasury, it seems most likely
that final regs won’t be published until, at the earliest, the
second quarter of 2017. It would be a welcome reprieve
for practitioners if the final regs were delayed as long as
those on the income taxation of private annuities, which
were proposed 10 years ago (but are still in the latest
Priority Guidance List) or those on IRC Section 2036(b),
which were proposed in 1983. We shouldn’t hold out
much hope of such a long reprieve.
Before this time, clients can still create FLPs, LLCs
or S corporations, taking advantage of the favorable
state statutes and tax case law. Creating such entities
will protect against the application of the proposed regs,
however, only to the extent that the client gives or sells
an interest in the entity before the final regs are promul
gated. Thus, practitioners need to prompt those clients
who are otherwise good candidates for creating such
entities to do so now, rather than to continue to ponder
their options. Tempus is fugiting.
One important issue is whether any discount in
an interest transferred before the effective date will be
recaptured if death occurs within three years of transfer.
In any case, it seems that if there’s no voting or liquida
tion right attributable to the transferred interest, there
would be no recapture under the three year rule if given
away before the effective date. For instance, if an entity
has voting and non-voting interests and non-voting
interests are given away (or sold) before the effective
date, there would be no “lapse” to recapture if death
occurs within three years of transfer. This result should
be contrasted with a non-voting interest in a family-con
trolled entity transferred after the effective date. In that
case, the transferred interest would be valued as though
it included a put right to obtain the minimum value.
Second, if the final regs are issued in a form similar
to the proposed regs, it will be virtually impossible to
obtain a valuation discount for marketable assets mere
ly by placing them in a family-controlled entity. The
value of even active businesses almost certainly will be
affected.
The regs shouldn’t affect the DLOM associated with
ownership of tangible real or personal property as a ten
ancy in common (TIC) or as community property. The
courts have routinely found that such partial interests
are entitled to significant valuation discounts, because

TRUSTS & ESTATES / tr u s ts a n d e s ta te s .c o m

25

"1Q40

u s . individual Incom e Fax P J f l

F E A T U R E : ESTATE P L A N N I N G & T A X A T I O N

there’s a far smaller market for partial interests than for
full ownership of an asset.65
O f course, one must be careful that a TIC not be
a partnership for tax purposes. W hen the parties to
a venture join together capital or services with the
intent of conducting a business or enterprise and of
sharing the profits and losses from the venture, a part
nership (or other business entity) is created for tax
purposes, without regard to state law.66 In Revenue Pro
cedure 2002-22, the IRS provided guidelines on when
it would rule that a TIC owning rental property wasn’t
taxable as a partnership.
Rev. Proc. 2002-22 states that the IRS will issue a pri
vate letter ruling that an undivided fractional interest in
rental real property isn’t an interest in a business entity,
under Treas. Regs. Section 301.7701-2(a), which applies
for estate and gift tax, as well as income tax purposes.
The family holding company also remains useful
for many non-tax reasons, including asset protection
and consolidation of management of multiple assets.
Families desiring such entities, after the final regs are
published, should consider giving each owner a put
right that complies with the requirements of the Sec
tion 2704(b) regs. This will avoid the application of
Section 2704(b), though the actual put right will fore
close much, if any, valuation discount. O f course, a put
isn’t always practical, because the entity may lack suffi
cient cash or borrowing power to satisfy an exercise of
the put, and some of the owners can’t be relied on not
to exercise their puts. In such cases, the practitioner can
create the same entities he’s traditionally used, but the
estate and gift tax valuation discounts will be largely,
if not completely, unavailable under the new regime of
Section 2704.
Also, the proposed regs may actually be beneficial for
estates that will owe no estate tax because of the unified
credit and marital deduction, even if valuation discounts
aren’t available under Section 2704. The beneficiaries
of such estates may find themselves with higher estate
tax values, but with concomitantly higher income tax
bases.67 If the higher estate tax value doesn’t generate
additional tax, the higher income tax basis may signifi
cantly reduce federal and state income tax liabilities.
Although the Section 2704 valuation rules, which may
increase transfer tax values of interests in a family-controlled entity, apply for estate, gift and GST tax purposes,
and the automatic change in basis for most assets trans
ferred by or received from a decedent is an income tax
26
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provision, it seems unlikely the IRS will take the position
that a taxpayer must pay estate tax on one value but the
basis change will be limited to a lower value.

A le rt C lients N ow
These are just proposed regs, but if the final regs
closely resemble the proposed regs, minority and
marketability discounts will become largely unavail
able for family-owned entities. Practitioners should
alert their clients of the need to act before the final
regs are published, if they wish to take advantage
of most of the discount planning that has become
a popular part of m odern estate planning.
®
—Authors’ note: Questions have been raised about
the effect of the proposed regulations. In particular, there’s
uncertainty about the consequences of disregarding a
restriction. As the authors read the proposed regulations,
the effect is to imply that the transferred interest carries a
right to unilaterally withdraw from the entity. Based on
informal discussions with IRS and Treasury personnel,
however, this may not reflect the government’s intent.
Further clarification on this important point will hopefully
be provided.
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SPOT

LIGHT

A Song in Her Heart
“Cleopatra,” by Irene Clark, sold for
$1,500 at Swann Auction Galleries’ AfricanAmerican Fine Art sale in New York City on
Oct. 6,2016. Clark was both a painter and a
designer; later in her career, she combined her
two passions and painted her designs on wooden
furniture for the Marshall Fields Company.
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61. See also United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S it. 1836 (2012)
(“examination of legislative history... [can lead to the conclusion that Con
gress had decided the question definitively], leaving no room for the agency
to reach a contrary result”).
62 .See Balestra v. United States 80S F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Under the Chev
ron framework, we begin by using the ordinary tools of statutory con
struction to determine whether Congress's intent is clear regarding the
precise question at issue. . . These tools include the statute’s text, structure,
cannons of statutory construction, and legislative history”); Estate of Cervin
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1994-550 (20 percent discount for undivided frac
tional interest in farm); Estate of Stevens v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 20 00-53 (25
percent discount for undivided fractional interest in improved real estate);
Williams v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1998-59 (44 percent discount for undivided
one-half interest in real estate; assessing attorney's fees against the Internal
Revenue Service for continuing to assert that the discount is limited to cost
of partitioning); Estate of Forbes v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2001-72 (30 percent
discount). With respect to a partial interest in artwork, see Estate of Elkins v.

Comm'r, 757 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’g in part, rev’g in part 140 T.C. 86 (2013)
(44.75 percent discount for a 73.055 percent undivided partial interest in an
art collection); Estate of Scull v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1994-211 (5 percent dis
count for an undivided 65 percent interest in a pop art collection); and Stone
v. United States, 2007 W L1544786 (N.D. Ca. 2007), supplemented by 2007 WL
2318974 (N.D. Ca. 2007), aff'd, Stone ex rei. Stone Trust Agreement v. United
States, 2009 WL 766497 (9th Cir. 2009) (5 percent discount for an undivided
50 percent interest in an art collection).
63. See Mayo, supra note 53, at p. 55.
64. See, e.g., National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Ser
vices, 545 U.S. 967 (20 05); United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S.
Ct. 1836 (2012).
65. See, e.g„ Propstra v. United States, 680 F2d 1248 (1999); Estate of Busch v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-3; Ludwick v. Comm'r T.C. Memo. 2010-104; LeFrak
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1993-526.
66. See Bussing v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 449 (1987), aff'd on reh'g, 89 T.C. 1050 (1987).
67. See Rev. Rul. 54-97, Treas. Regs. Section 1.1014-3(a).
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